Inquiries and coups

“Pakistan rejects US findings on deadly air strike” was a typical western headline on December 23, following the report on the killing of 24 Pakistani army soldiers in Mohmand on November 26. It is hardly surprising that the army’s first reaction was to state that the report was “short on facts”, if only because the Pakistani account of events was not considered in any way. The story, now, is that Pakistan refused to take part in the inquiry, and, like all skilful propaganda, the yarn has a modicum of truth.
Pakistan was informed it would not have equal status in the inquiry, so it was decided not to accept an inferior position, as Pakistanis would be excluded from the most important information. There was no question of it having equivalent representation. Can you imagine the US allowing a Pakistani brigadier to question a US air force pilot who had been involved in the Mohmand air strikes? Or having access to the record of computer exchanges? Not the remotest hope.
At the head of the inquiry was US Air Force Special Forces Brigadier General Stephen Clark whose last job involved responsibility “for preparing air force special operations forces (SOF) for missions worldwide in support of the army, navy and marine corps special operations forces and USAF counterparts.” Just the man to be objective and totally impartial about the killing of foreign soldiers by a US aircraft supporting a special mission.
Here he is speaking on December 22 about the shambles: “in the background is a series of telephone calls from Pakistani LNOs (liaison officers) to their RC – regional command element liaisons to say that their forces are under fire. There is confusion caused by this because there is a lack of precision as to where this is occurring. When asked, the general answer back was, well, you know where it is because you’re shooting at them, rather than giving a position. So again, understanding that there was no – understanding that there were border positions in the area, people trying to do the right thing and nail down specifics so they can take action caused quite a bit of confusion.” (Google ‘DOD News Briefing Gen Clark’ for the entire performance.)
In spite of most of that being gobbledegook, there is no confusion about the essential facts: there was, that night, only one series of US airstrikes along the border. They were on the Pakistani army positions in Mohmand that had detected movement in an area in which they had not been informed there was to be activity by the US forces. So the soldiers fired on what they reasonably supposed to be a Taliban incursion from Afghanistan, similar to that in October that killed two Pakistani soldiers.
If the US high command did not know exactly where their aircraft were firing, then matters have come to a sad professional pass in the most hi-tech military in the world. These aircraft know to the exact metre where they are striking. The sensible thing to have done would have been to order ‘Stop!’, and conducted some basic checks as to what was going on. It is that simple. “You know where it is because you’re shooting at them” has an inescapable logic.
Then we come to the “misunderstandings” about where the Pakistan army positions are located, and I say, from first-hand knowledge, that the denial of this by the US is not credible. I travelled in Mohmand at the beginning of November and had a comprehensive briefing by the 77 Brigade on all aspects of operations. I am satisfied that the “coalition forces” in Afghanistan know the exact location of every post of the Pakistan army along the border. Later details from Afghanistan (from an Isaf source) and Pakistan have reinforced my conviction. But there is another side to this.
The suave and articulate Brigadier General Clark was asked by a reporter: “were you saying that when the US has given....information to the Pakistanis, the US operations have been compromised?”
Clark’s reply was that “It was US or Isaf operations were believed to be compromised due to that. And again, that was not the scope of the investigation, so that was told to us as part of the atmospherics within the Isaf headquarters on down. We did not dig into that; we did not validate it. That was just indicated to us. In fact, there was an operation on October 5 in the same region where, when they went to in-fill the helicopters, they were hit with RPG fire, so that lends to their mindset as well – so, Isaf operations being compromised by sharing that information.”
This is not altogether intelligible (although “in-fill” is a wonderful construction), but what comes out, loud and clear, is that Clark didn’t “validate” the important, the vital, evidence that information concerning US operations on the border with Pakistan is not given to Pakistan.
Little wonder that the Pakistan army doesn’t trust the US military and states, correctly, that the Clark investigation is “short on facts”.
And while we’re on the subject of fairy stories, I’ll tell you that there is not going to be an army coup. Apart from the fact that Gen Kayani has made it quite clear for many years that he will not involve the army in anti-constitutional antics, he would be somewhat unwise to take over the country in the state it’s in. And all the politicians’ hysteria and media hype to the contrary is ludicrous. As Brigadier General Clark said in his comical media foray: it’s all “part of the atmospherics” that “lends to their mindset”.

Copyright Thenews 27.12.2011